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Zimring on Mass Incarceration: Empirical 




There have been two dramatic criminal justice phenomena 
in recent decades that have occupied most of Professor Franklin 
Zimring’s attention. The current occasion, of course, is his effort 
to address mass incarceration—which is the tremendous in-
crease in national imprisonment after 1970.1 This effort was 
foreshadowed in 1991 when Professor Zimring and Gordon Haw-
kins wrote their magisterial book The Scale of Imprisonment.2 
But between that book and this new one came a pair of books by 
Professor Zimring that addressed the equally anomalous phe-
nomenon of the great crime decline in the 1990s—an ironic end-
of-twentieth-century parallel. My goal here is to compare the 
ways by which Professor Zimring has contemplated these events. 
My premise is that doing so helps capture some of the intellec-
tual history of American academic thought about criminal jus-
tice. And also, that it might serve to justify Professor Zimring’s 
work as a model of how we should conduct our thinking of what 
philosophical stance we should adopt as we face the most chal-
lenging questions about crime and punishment. I draw from Pro-
fessor Zimring a kind of tragic wisdom about crime and justice 
that can enable idealistic reform by curing us of hubris and na-
iveté. 
 
†  Edwin E. Huddleson, Jr. Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Copy-
right © 2020 by Robert Weisberg.  
 1. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE INSIDIOUS MOMENTUM OF MASS INCARCER-
ATION (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author). 
 2. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, THE SCALE 
OF IMPRISONMENT (1991). 
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I suggest here that the core overlap of Professor Zimring’s 
approaches to these phenomena is that he views the measurable 
conditions of crime, and the measurable operations of and 
changes in criminal justice, as to some extent irreducibly myste-
rious. This sense of mystery rests on a studied belief that the 
proliferation of statistical data and technical innovations in our 
analysis of the data tempts us into an ill-founded confidence in 
our ability to understand why things happen in crime and jus-
tice, to predict what will happen next, and to guide us in sustain-
ing good things and stopping or reversing bad things. The mys-
teries he uncovers are frustrating and yet alluringly fascinating, 
depressing, and oddly reassuring. Professor Zimring is a worried 
skeptic—indeed often a pessimist—about what we can ulti-
mately know or understand about trends in crime and imprison-
ment. But he is sometimes a cautiously hedge-betting optimist 
about the possibilities for salutary change in American social be-
havior and even in the capacity of government to induce positive 
change. Ironically, he reconciles these predispositions by sug-
gesting that we should have some faith that good things can hap-
pen even if the limits of cognition make it hard for us to know 
why or how they will. So here I hope to show the different ways 
these features of Professor Zimring’s thinking play out on these 
two subjects. 
I.  THE CRIME DECLINE AND THE MOOD SWINGS OF 
CRIMINOLOGY 
In his 2007 book The Great American Crime Decline, Profes-
sor Zimring acknowledged “the ‘natural appetite’ for explana-
tions” and the desire for a bottom line.3 Yet, he bluntly disa-
vowed offering any bottom line for reasons, again, that are both 
encouraging and discouraging. In the 1990s, the American crime 
rate dropped precipitously4 and shortly after 2000, commenta-
tors began to offer surmises or supposed statistical proofs about 
the causes—ranging from population changes to changes in drug 
 
 3. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 195 
(2007). 
 4. Of course, the degree of the decline is a function of choices of crimes to 
measure and data to rely on, but a good very reliable indicator is homicide. The 
homicide rate in the United States doubled in the decade after 1964, and then 
the decline after 1993 was equal to 70 percent of the earlier increase—bringing 
homicides almost down to the level before that earlier rise. Id. at 6. And a con-
servative estimate for the decline in major common crimes generally is 35 per-
cent. Id. at 196. 
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appetites to legalization of abortion to various innovations in po-
licing.5 For Professor Zimring, the discouraging news was that 
none of these notions held up very well. He found “no short list 
of leading indicators” consistent with the decline, but no distinct 
explanatory cause.6 He ascribed the lack of clarity to the limits 
of what social scientists can know, the parochialism of practi-
tioners of various disciplines, and the impossibility of creating 
controlled experiments.7 In his review of the flourishing of sup-
posed explanations, Professor Zimring performed the traditional 
task of criticizing studies for failing to address confounding var-
iables, but he also noted that some of the things being credited 
for the decline of the 1990s had actually begun in the 1980s, 
when crime rates were still rising.8 And most notably, he cast 
radical doubt on the most-touted causal factors by simply refer-
ring us to Canada—the nation closest to us along dimensions of 
demographics, economics, and government—reminding us that 
Canada experienced a similar crime decline without any of those 
factors offered to explain the American decline.9 Professor Zim-
ring clearly intended the Canada comparison to serve as a sobri-
ety-inducing admonition to others—as it clearly was for him.  
While Professor Zimring nodded in the direction of more so-
phisticated policing as an explanation, his best guess was that 
the decline was a phenomenon of multiple causation or conflu-
ence. Although there is a tone of lament about our epistemologi-
cal limitations, he does draw some happy news. We know a lot of 
plausible causes, and this is good if we do not expect too much 
precision on percentage contribution but are open to experi-
ments in reinforcing any of those factors. In addition, the most 
dramatic site of the crime decline—New York City—exhibited no 
changes in the various social and economic conditions or demo-
graphic distributions that we often look to when we assess crime 
rates, so we can take comfort that change is possible even if in-
explicable. The sheer mystery is kind of positive—miracles do 
happen, and maybe we can make a side bet on the foreseeability 
of the human species even if we cannot understand it. At least 
we know that high crime rates are not hard-wired or inertial. 
 
 5. E.g., Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: 
Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 
163 (2004). 
 6. ZIMRING, supra note 3, at 195. 
 7. Id. at 202–05. 
 8. Id. at 81. 
 9. Id. at 107–35, 197–234. 
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Six years later in his follow-up book, The City that Became 
Safe, Professor Zimring returned to this subject and in particu-
lar to New York, site of the most dramatic instance of the great 
decline.10 In this book, he was more willing to draw lessons from 
factors he saw as at least strong correlates, even if not suscepti-
ble to formal proof. These were mainly certain types of policing 
(although he presciently discounted one policing factor—the 
high-volume use of stop-and-frisk tactics).11 Ultimately Profes-
sor Zimring has suggested that we need to rely on what he calls 
“triangulation of proof”—that is, in effect, crowd-sourcing of im-
perfect methods hoping they are additive rather than quixoti-
cally seeking the right method.12 But pervading the book is a 
continuing sense of delighted surprise at the mystery of the mag-
nitude of the change—a sign of social redemption. 
II.  THE CHALLENGES OF UNDERSTANDING THE 
PRISON BOOM 
So then we turn to prisons—and here I suggest that Profes-
sor Zimring’s approach shows both symmetries and asymmetries 
with his approach to the crime decline. The 1991 Zimring-Haw-
kins book showed Professor Zimring’s radical skepticism.13 The 
authors concluded that historians and criminologists had been 
unable to develop—indeed the modern ones had barely bothered 
to try to develop—any plausible explanations of why certain so-
cieties at certain times had their manifest imprisonment rates.14 
Forget about causation—there were not even meaningful corre-
lations.  
And so now the post-1970 prison boom is a mystery. How 
was it that the per capita number of prison inmates grew by 
400% from 1972 to 2007?15 But before we move on to Professor 
Zimring’s examination of causes, note that for him the relevant 
boom is in prison admissions, not static rate population ratios, 
in part because Professor Zimring associates himself with the 
 
 10. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE 
(2012). 
 11. Id. at 100–50. 
 12. ZIMRING, supra note 3, at 203. 
 13. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 2. 
 14. For a thoughtful essay on this book and an argument that it was greatly 
underappreciated, see generally Kevin R. Reitz, Zimring, Hawkins, and the 
Macro Problems of Imprisonment, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604 (1997). 
 15. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 1 at 8). 
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normative view that much of the harm of imprisonment lies in 
collateral consequences for the inmate and others.16 
Now on to his assessment of causes, and its parallel to his 
view of crime rates. The venerable tropes about the uniqueness 
of America’s crime and punishment—the frontier mentality, the 
Revolution-rooted libertarian spirit—may be good for static in-
ternational comparisons but useless in telling us about historical 
comparisons across time in the United States.17 We are re-
minded of course that the national figure is the sum of fifty-one 
figures from diverse jurisdictions and that the diversity of crim-
inal justice systems and social conditions should produce a bell-
shaped curve with low tails.18 But here is the true anomaly: 
every data point on a 1970s bell-shaped curve of state and fed-
eral prison rates went up sharply at a roughly similar proportion 
of the base, regardless of where a jurisdiction sat on the contin-
uum of punitiveness.19 Thus, none of the state-specific ap-
proaches to imprisonment can explain the boom. 
As with crime rates, intuitively appealing explanations do 
not explain. First, crime rates cannot do the work. The fluctua-
tions in reported crimes, and the downward trajectory during the 
latter phase of the prison boom, belie any simple notion that 
more crime caused more imprisonment, or even that there was 
enough crime to spur an exaggerated fear of crime that might, in 
turn, explain the prison boom.20 Nor can arrest rates serve to 
explain.21 Arrests may even be an example of reverse causality 
because an increase in imprisonment leads to more parole which 
leads, depending on jurisdictional rules, to more arrests for vio-
lations of parole conditions.22 Professor Zimring disdains arrest 
rates, not only because their trajectory does not match well with 
the prison admissions boom, but also because prosecutors have 
so much unguided (and rarely measured) discretion in choosing 
 
 16. See id. (manuscript ch. 1).  
 17. Professor Zimring attributes some of these notions about American ex-
ceptionalism to our love of citing de Tocqueville. Id. (manuscript ch. 1 at 7).  
 18. A separate question is whether the rise in the imprisonment rate is 
what caused the lowered crime rate. This is a much-studied subject, with a con-
sensus of academics concluding that only a small portion of the crime drop can 
be attributed to the incapacitative or deterrent effect of increased imprison-
ment. E.g., RYAN KING ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATION AND 
CRIME: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP (2005).  
 19. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 1). 
 20. Id. (manuscript ch. 2 at 13–14). 
 21. Id. (manuscript ch. 2 at 15–22). 
 22. Id. (manuscript ch. 2 at 22). 
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which arrestees to charge at all and which to charge with prison-
eligible crimes.23 Indeed, Professor Zimring assigns so much 
weight to prosecutors’ discretion that he disdains the view that 
harsher and more formulaic penal legislation in the “determi-
nate sentencing” era can explain the prison boom.24 For Profes-
sor Zimring, prosecutors can render even mandatory sentences 
non-mandatory.25 
Nor does Professor Zimring credit new policies with respect 
to particular crimes for the increase in prison admissions. For 
the crimes that produce the most frequent and longest prison 
sentences per case—homicide and other violent crimes—the 
rates of incidence and arrests somewhat rose at times after 1970 
but not in any way that strongly correlates with the prison 
boom.26 Rather, for Professor Zimring, the salient fact—and the 
vexing mystery—is that after 1970, pretty much regardless of 
the category of crime or criminal or the available menu of 
charges, the penalty was a prison sentence.27 
Professor Zimring acknowledges that his doubts that social 
policy concerning distinct social harms that merit imprisonment 
can explain the prison boom finds an exception for drugs.28 Pro-
fessor Zimring somewhat finesses the drug contribution by as-
cribing much of it to the arguably exogenous factor of federal 
prosecution or to that factor’s own root cause in vast explanation 
of the federal regulatory bureaucracy and DEA resources—an 
example of redundant jurisdiction.29 But while he acknowledges 
that the War on Drugs must have somewhat contributed to the 
prison boom, his skepticism applies to even this low-hanging em-
pirical fruit, and his focus on drugs also leads back to his more 
general skepticism about the arrest rate/imprisonment rate link-
age.30 As Professor Zimring shows, drug arrests fluctuated errat-
ically through the 1950s, then exploded from 1959 to 1973, but 
then fluctuated again in the next two decades.31 Hence “[t]he 
lack of fit between patterns of drug arrests and prison population 
 
 23. Id. (manuscript ch. 2 at 39). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. (manuscript ch. 2 at 39, ch. 8 at 2). 
 26. Id. (manuscript ch. 1). 
 27. See id. (manuscript ch. 1 at 17–18).  
 28. Id. (manuscript ch. 4 at 7–11). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (manuscript ch. 1).  
 31. Id. (manuscript ch. 2 at 19–20). 
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is startling.”32 Consider Professor Zimring’s treatment of this 
knotty question: “To the extent that a relatively fixed expansion 
of imprisonment might be either desired or tolerated in the years 
after 1972, the crimes or sentence lengths that are added to 
reach that level may not be an overwhelmingly important influ-
ence on the motivation or tolerance for prison growth.”33  
Here, in a sentence worthy of former Federal Reserve Chair 
Alan Greenspan for its syntactical caution, Professor Zimring 
shows his agnosticism about how the most intuitively plausible 
inputs—governmental policy focus on particular crimes or longer 
sentences due to legislative, prosecutorial, or judicial choice—
can work as explanations of the prison rate boom. Rather, if 
there was some general tropism toward using prison as the 
proper penalty for crimes, that tropism operated on its own in-
herent force, as demonstrated by this key statement about 
drugs: 
To the extent, then, that the relatively constant growth of imprison-
ment before and after the peak emphasis on the war on drugs indicates 
that drug offenders simply crowded out marginal property offenders or 
restrained longer prison sentences for street criminals when they took 
priority in the late 1980s, the drug panic may not have been itself a 
primary cause of change in the growth rate of imprisonment.34  
Thus, Professor Zimring argues the drug war of the mid-
1980s was less a cause of the prison expansion of even the twenty 
years thereafter than a result of the monopoly of prison as the 
only policy choice considered at this time. “The questions varied 
from robbery and homicide to repeat offenders, to child molest-
ers, to crack users and dealers. Yet whatever the question of the 
day, the answer was always prison.”35 
III.  THE DISTRESSED DIALECTIC ON CAUSE 
Throughout his new book, Professor Zimring emphasizes 
that most of the leverage for prison admissions is at the local 
level, because that is where the true power lies and also where 
general social attitudes in favor of punitiveness have their most 
directly visceral effect.36 And the major actor in this situation is 
obviously the county district attorney (DA). In this regard, Pro-
fessor Zimring would not necessarily disagree with Professor 
 
 32. Id. (manuscript ch. 2 at 21). 
 33. Id. (manuscript ch. 1 at 31). 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. (manuscript ch. 1 at 32). 
 36. Id. (manuscript ch. 2 at 2–3). 
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John Pfaff ’s thesis that the key lever in the increase in impris-
onment rates after 1970 was the prosecutorial decision to seek 
prison over probation (as opposed to legislation of longer sen-
tences).37 Professor Zimring would concede that prosecutors 
were properly positioned to effect the shift to prison sentences if 
they wanted to do so, but, his question is why that change in 
prosecutorial practice occurred when it did.38 If nothing im-
portant changed in the institutional situation or power of prose-
cutors after 1970, the dominant role of the local prosecutor can-
not tell us anything about why the prison boom happened. So 
Professor Zimring ardently searches for evidence of some new 
independent factor that motivated prosecutors to deploy their in-
herent leverage to favor prison much more than they had ear-
lier.39  
As he undertakes this search, Professor Zimring posits three 
key candidates. One is the possibility of a political phenome-
non—increased salience of public concern about crime, with its 
fairly direct effect on prosecutorial behavior.40 He separates the 
salience of the crime issue in terms of voter priorities—and the 
hostility toward government leniency—from the more reactive 
subjective fear of crime.41 And he underscores that the former 
can exist independent of the latter.42 Ironically, he cites this fac-
tor as one explanation for such harsh penal legislation as the 
Three Strikes law,43 even though he elsewhere disdains harsh 
new penal legislation as an empirically sound candidate as a 
causal factor for the prison boom.44 So he is damning this candi-
date with his faint praise. In any event, he seems wary of making 
much of this factor, perhaps fearing that it is too close to a tempt-
ing but vague or even tautological notion that voters in the 1970s 
 
 37. JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN, 128–36 (2016). 
 38. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 2).  
 39. Recall that Professor Zimring has already cast doubt on whether post-
1970 harsher and more formulaic sentencing laws can explain the boom, despite 
the common—indeed clichéd—view that mandatory minimums and other rigid 
laws transferred power from judges to prosecutors. For Professor Zimring, that 
legislation may have changed the tools in the prosecutors’ toolkit, but he be-
lieves that prosecutors’ charging discretion always gave them quite sufficient 
devices to get the penalties they preferred. The question is why the preference 
changed. 
 40. Id. (manuscript ch. 2). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. (manuscript ch. 2 at 15). 
 44. Id. (manuscript ch. 3). 
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waxed punitive to express their disdain for the social permissive-
ness we associate with the 1960s. 
Another candidate is what Professor Zimring describes as 
the greater intensity of adversarial dynamics in response to the 
Warren Court’s re-reading of the Bill of Rights to favor criminal 
defendants.45 Here, Professor Zimring properly cites the famous 
thesis of Professor William Stuntz about how the Warren Court 
emphasized procedural rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments as opposed to the possibility of using the Eighth 
Amendment to limit the power of states to legislate harsh crime 
definitions and sentences.46 Presumably, the point would be this: 
the Warren Court empowered defense lawyers to fight prosecu-
tors through all manner of pretrial motions involving limitations 
on police searches and interrogations and new rules regarding 
jury selection, thus raising the cost of criminal ligation to prose-
cutors and creating new arenas where lawyer-against-lawyer 
warfare intensified. And then, prosecutors presumably fought 
back with higher-sentence charges or sentencing recommenda-
tions. Professor Zimring essentially just mentions this as a plau-
sible factor—and then he drops it.47 
A third candidate is that something was undeniably a new 
factor at the level of local prosecution: the widespread adoption 
of modern management science methods to promote efficiency 
and enable more objective evaluation criteria and processes in 
district attorney offices.48 The very concreteness of this factor 
and the lesser likelihood with this candidate (than the other two) 
that it is endogenous seems to lead Professor Zimring to initially 
give greater credence to it.49 But it turns out that his treatment 
of this factor only underscores his agnosticism about causality 
more generally. The intrusion of business-school-type supervi-
sory and accountability protocols—long after they had become 
common in other professions or businesses—might well have led 
prosecutors to focus on a high ratio of imprisonment outcomes as 
a key measure by which line DAs could prove their worth. Pro-
fessor Zimring observes that the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration stepped in with financial incentives for local 
prosecutors to join its Prosecutor’s Management Information 
 
 45. Id. (manuscript ch. 3 at 16–20). 
 46. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
196–243 (2011). 
 47. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 3 at 16–20). 
 48. Id. (manuscript ch. 3 at 20–25). 
 49. Id. 
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System (PROMIS), and prosecutors became computer literate in 
the new world of criminal justice sabermetrics.50 But did this in-
tervention really change prison admissions? Professor Zimring 
seems to lose heart in this possible insight after a brief moment 
of analytic excitement: “[T]he history of the period is too crowded 
with other adversarial pressures to test a wholly independent 
measurement effect.”51  
But let me add another aspect of Professor Zimring’s vexa-
tion. He observes that the management explanation is a brutally 
ironic version of unintended consequences.52 Nothing in the 
premises of the accountability and evaluation schemes devel-
oped by management experts would require or necessarily pro-
mote more prison admissions as a marker, much less the key 
marker, of greater prosecutorial efficiency.53 But Professor Zim-
ring does stress that the favoring of prison was foreseeable—as 
if the purveyors of business-school protocols should have antici-
pated this effect.54 Not to get into inapt reliance on mens rea 
principles, but that these purveyors and their clients were neg-
ligent in essentially enabling the prison admissions boom be-
speaks Professor Zimring’s ambivalent reluctance to leave mys-
tery as mystery. 
So after trying hard to identify a distinct time-specific and 
independent causal factor, Professor Zimring concludes that the 
best evidence that we have from the multiple causes is that a 
variety of doctrinal and systemic changes jointly produced such 
prosecutorial emphasis on prison for a wide variety of crimes.55 
Further, for Professor Zimring, the boom was consistent with 
prosecutorial ambitions that cut across all crimes and criminals. 
And even assuming the force of these factors, what Professor 
Zimring calls their “modest intensity,”56 falls short of explaining 
their huge arguable effect on the system. 
Professor Zimring describes all of these as “metaphorical 
references” to causation.57 Elsewhere, in skeptically reviewing 
various hopeful predictions of recommendations for lowering 
prison rates, he says: “So analogies and metaphors are pressed 
 
 50. Id. (manuscript ch. 3 at 22–24). 
 51. Id. (manuscript ch. 3 at 23).  
 52. Id. (manuscript ch. 3 at 24).  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (manuscript ch. 3 at 24–25). 
 55. Id. (manuscript ch. 3).  
 56. Id. (manuscript ch. 3 at 24).  
 57. Id. (manuscript ch. 3 at 20).  
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into service where the known history of imprisonment cannot in-
struct.”58 As he reviews the variety of inputs into the American 
prison rate, he laments that “it is . . . impossible to assess how 
important each factor individually or all of them collectively 
have been in contributing to the actual size of the prison expan-
sion of the post-1970 era.”59 One peculiarity of the American sit-
uation, he observes:  
[I]s how loosely linked the characteristics of U.S. government and 
crime policy are to social and demographic factors that might be dis-
cussed when searching for the causes of variations in crime. Variations 
in crime rates over time have played a relatively minor role in explain-
ing variations in imprisonment, so a detailed search for changes in the 
population and the economy that might influence crime rates are not 
high on the agenda of things which might have major impact on rates 
of imprisonment. Of course, very large shifts upward or downward in 
rates of serious crime should have some influence on resulting prison 
populations, but there have been no projections of demography or eco-
nomic futures over the past half-century that powerfully predicted ma-
jor variations in levels of crime. Just as changes in the age structure in 
the population and of economic trends have had little influence on 
crime rates or imprisonment, there is no reason to expect this loose 
linkage will abate in the foreseeable future.60 
IV.  REVERSING THE BOOM—CAN HOPE TRIUMPH OVER 
EXPERIENCE? 
To return to my notion of comparing Professor Zimring’s 
treatments of the two major criminological events at the end of 
the last century, the asymmetry between this new book and 
those on the crime decline has to do with a new layer of pessi-
mism. On both subjects Professor Zimring has exhibited anxiety 
and downright pessimism about our intellectual capacities to un-
derstand the past.61 But on the subject of the prison boom, we 
see a deep pessimism about whether we can know or control 
what will come next.62 There is no logical inconsistency in this 
mood difference about the futures of the two phenomena, but the 
striking difference in tone in these two phases of Professor Zim-
ring’s work merits examination. 
To set up this examination here, I diverge into a very spec-
ulative thought experiment about the basis for this asymmetry. 
 
 58. Id. (manuscript ch. 5 at 4). 
 59. Id. (manuscript ch. 4 at 21). 
 60. Id. (manuscript ch. 4 at 24–25) (citation omitted). 
 61. Id. (manuscript ch. 5). 
 62. Id. 
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My excuse for doing so is that it is inspired by the very genera-
tive speculations that pervade Professor Zimring’s new book.  
With respect to the great crime decline, we might infer from 
Professor Zimring’s 2006 and 2012 books that he is mildly opti-
mistic that the rates can remain low.63 To be more precise, even 
if they show a tendency to go up again, we now have demon-
strated our capacity to constrain them again, whether as policy-
makers or as a behaviorally resilient species. But if prediction to 
some extent must rest on historical observation, what would the 
basis be for this optimism, given Professor Zimring’s difficulty in 
sorting out the multiple possible causes of the decline? Might the 
multiple causation itself justify optimism? This is a tricky ques-
tion that can go off in a number of uncharted tangents. If, hypo-
thetically, there were five causes of the decline and their conflu-
ence was the key, would the disappearance of one or two as weak 
links undo the good work? Or would the continued presence or 
force of some of them be sufficient to sustain the low rate?  
And what about inertia? What is the inherent sustainability 
of low crime rates? Consider some possibilities: might a reduc-
tion in the public salience of crime that results from the crime 
decline lead to more permissive social attitudes that in turn 
would lead to more crime? Or to the extent that one believes that 
the experiences of being arrested and convicted and imprisoned 
are themselves criminogenic, would the low crime rate indeed be 
self-sustaining? On the other hand, concerning the decarcerative 
policies demanded by those who decry mass incarceration—in 
part because so many believe that the lower crime rates disprove 
the need for high imprisonment rates—could these polices them-
selves become criminogenic because the wrong people, or too 
many people, will be released or never imprisoned?64 Perhaps we 
 
 63. ZIMRING, supra note 3; ZIMRING, supra note 10. 
 64. Recent California history may be informative. The state’s 2011 Realign-
ment law (discussed by Professor Zimring at chapter 5) shifted much of the re-
sponsibility of incarceration from state prisons to county jails—with the added 
design and effect that those placed in jails would likely have shorter sentences 
and be “out on the streets” more quickly. Critics of the new law identified vari-
ous indicia of a post-2011 crime rise they attributed to the new law. See Press 
Release, Criminal Justice Legal Found., More Evidence of Rising Crime Under 
Realignment (Feb. 8, 2013), https://www.cjlf.org/releases/13-03.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/SVT9-VQZA]. Empiricists responded with studies refuting the link-
age, except for a spike in one category—auto thefts—which they could not con-
fidently disconnect from the new law. See MAGNUS LOFSTROM & STEVEN RAPH-
AEL, PUBLIC POLICY INST. OF CAL., PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT AND CRIME 
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must look to the history of the crime rise in the 1960s and 1970s 
and ask how the fabled low crime rates of the 1950s did not sus-
tain themselves. Alas, the causes of that rise are themselves 
heavily contested and perhaps unknowable, save for the sheer 
rise in the proportion of young people in the population as a re-
sult of the post-World War II Baby Boom,65 and some amorphous 
and perhaps tautological attributions to the permissiveness of 
the counterculture. Or, finally, if we believe that the key factor 
in the crime decline was better policing, is there any reason to 
fear that policing will worsen again? 
In any event, maybe it is the simplistic fact that the crime 
decline is a good thing that gives it more inertia than a bad thing 
would have. There might be more social consensus behind poli-
cies to curtail the inertia with prison rates than with the policies 
that created mass imprisonment. Or maybe it is the apparent 
fact that the good thing is more a manifestation of the plasticity 
of human behavior and less attributable to controversial govern-
mental policy than the prison boom. By contrast, maybe high 
prison rates are more prone to stick or even increase because of 
either the continuation or worsening of bad government policies 
or exogenous effects (like new gang structures or new entries on 
the drug market).66 Or will it be easier to change a bad thing that 
is (maybe) clearly due to government policies?  
However we address these speculative problems, Professor 
Zimring’s expectations about our ability to reverse mass incar-
ceration seem quite opposite to his optimism about crime rates. 
Simply put, he is awed and indeed intimidated by the magnitude 
of the prison boom and by our inability to have predicted it or 
even to understand it, and as a result he feels overwhelmed by 
the challenge of imagining how to correct it.67 Given how unnat-
 
RATES IN CALIFORNIA (2013), https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_ 
1213MLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL64-T2UY]. 
 65. E.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 58–59 (1974) (using 
the metaphor of a barbarian invasion to describe the demographic change). 
 66. The intrusion of crack cocaine was blamed for a crime spike in the 1990s 
(and the curtailment of crack consumption partly credited for the crime decline). 
See Levitt, supra note 5, at 163–64. In an interesting twist, Professor Zimring 
sees the new national panic over opioid abuse not as a sign of an increase in 
perceived crime that would spark an increase in punishment, but rather a re-
thinking about whether the criminal justice system is the right instrument for 
dealing with an epidemic of this vast scale, especially when this is largely a 
white person’s epidemic. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6). 
 67. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 5). 
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ural that event was, a modestly optimistic person might con-
clude, or at least make a bet, that normalizing forces in society 
will be able to reverse it. But Professor Zimring is not that opti-
mist. He states: “A return to 100 prisoners per 100,000 citizens 
would in some respects be a more radical alteration of institu-
tional operations and expectations than the radical expansion 
that preceded 2007.”68 Professor Zimring exhibits an existential 
sense that the boom was a kind of late-historical original sin 
committed by American society, which is now destined to suffer 
the consequences of that sin for a long time. 
The middle parts of the book contain a number of reasons 
for his worry. He notes the embeddedness of the jurisdictional 
redundancy caused by the federal role in drug prosecution, citing 
danger signs in the continued and even increased allocation of 
federal resources to regulatory and law enforcement agencies 
dealing with drugs.69 He fears that the post-1970 voluminous 
prison construction will haunt us because the past investment 
and the high rate of fixed costs mean that marginal costs of new 
prison admissions will not provide much of a deterrent to the 
states.70 He cautions that despite the empirical evidence to the 
contrary, functionaries with an occupational stake in the prison 
boom will convince much of the public to attribute the happy new 
low crime rates to the boom.71 
He is skeptical about the ostensibly pragmatic belief that 
there is “a [l]aw of [p]enal [g]ravity,”72 a colorful term for a belief 
in regression to the mean by which the anomaly of the great 
prison boom will correct itself. For one, he has lost faith, if he 
ever had it, in even short- and middle-range predictions of future 
levels of imprisonment, so he regards the gravity idea as mainly 
a wish—or another metaphor.73 For Professor Zimring, it is very 
hard to conceive that any law of gravity has survived the state 
and federal trends that have led to this impasse.74 To admiringly 
mimic Professor Zimring’s style of verbal irony, if there were 
ever a law of penal gravity, the prison boom repealed it. Profes-
sor Zimring also disdains reformist campaigns that manifest a 
kind of golden ageism by naively assuming that if there were 
 
 68. Id. (manuscript ch. 5 at 5). 
 69. Id. (manuscript ch. 4). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. (manuscript ch. 5 at 4–6).  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
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once social conditions and governmental policies that enabled 
the once low prison rates, there must be a way to restore them.75  
True, the prison admission rate has flattened since 2007,76 
but Professor Zimring waffles on what to make of it. On the one 
hand, he notes that even in those states that showed increases 
in imprisonment after 2007, those increases were very small 
compared to the boom years.77 On the other hand, he cautions 
that much of the flattening can be ascribed to the anomalous 
case of California, whose sheer size ensures that its numbers will 
distort the national picture and whose big prison drop was con-
tingent on distinct, and perhaps unique, legal circumstances.78 
Among all the possible predictions for the next era of prison 
admissions, Professor Zimring suggests that as a cautious de-
fault we should assume there will be business as usual, with the 
relevant “usual” being the policies that have allowed for the flat-
tening of the prison boom in the last few years.79 But that usual 
business is associated with 600,000 prison admissions in 2017, a 
fifth lower than the 2006 peak, but more than we saw in 1998.80 
If so, Professor Zimring calculates that continuing that business 
will mean we will not get back to our pre-boom levels for many 
years.81 Put differently, after 2007, we saw an 34% national de-
crease in prison admissions, but Professor Zimring warns: 
Were this 34% national rate decrease in 10 years maintained consist-
ently for 36 years—or one year longer than the 35 years that caused 
the 400% increase—the rate of imprisonment in the United States in 
2043 would be 326 per 100,000, so that well over half of the gains reg-
istered during 1972 to 2007 would have been retained four decades 
later.82 
So the post-2007 pattern that remains, for him, is as much 
a worrisome admonition as it is a reassurance. We must have 
done something good in the last nine years. We can give our-
selves credit for that but must also accept the possibility that 
this is the best we can do with the monstrosity we created. 
 
 75. Id. (manuscript ch. 5). 
 76. Id. (manuscript ch. 5 at 10 fig. 2). 
 77. Id. (manuscript ch. 5). 
 78. Most obviously, as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Plata, 
the medical and mental health care treatment of inmates in the California pris-
ons, traceable to illegal overcrowding, required a drastic reduction in the prison 
population. 563 U.S. 493 (2011); ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 5).  
 79. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 5).  
 80. Id. (manuscript ch. 5 at 11).  
 81. Id. (manuscript ch. 5). 
 82. Id. (manuscript ch. 5 at 11).  
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Professor Zimring makes a few gestures in the direction of 
specific legislative reforms, allowing that some cutbacks in se-
vere drug sentences for possession (or for small-time sales done 
merely to support one’s habit) are likely to happen and will lower 
prison rates.83 He speculates (though unconvincingly) that rec-
ognizing many crimes classified as sexual assault are non-rape 
offenses committed intra-family, may prove more amenable to 
such alternative measures as restorative justice.84 He speculates 
that we might rethink the severity of harm ascribed to posses-
sion of child pornography.85 But, however likely he believes these 
changes are, he does not indicate any great faith that they can 
substantially mitigate our original sin. And Professor Zimring 
adds a further admonition still. As with these possible legislative 
changes, he indicates some hope that while we will never well 
understand what caused the boom, jurisdictions can at least ex-
periment with various means of achieving decarceration.86 In-
deed he seems to favor eclectic experimentation rather than put-
ting all hope in some singular plan and then not having any Plan 
B or Plan C.87 But then as a statistical matter he alerts us that 
diversity of efforts will produce a bell-shaped curve of decarcer-
ation outcomes that will moderate the national degree of mitiga-
tion.88 It is as if he wants a unitary approach to reverse a unitary 
trend, but there is no way to do so. “Just as the rare unanimity 
of increases during the high growth era magnified the increases, 
a return to diversity will probably moderate the level of de-
cline.”89 
CONCLUSION—AND FINAL CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM 
Although, as I have suggested, Professor Zimring does not 
show much passion about various concrete legal changes that he 
says might alleviate our prison crisis, toward the end of the new 
book he sketches out some ideas about changes sufficiently foun-
dational to belie his sober doubts about big reform.  
He does of course try to draw some political science lessons 
from the California experience, but they are mainly about how 
 
 83. Id. (manuscript ch. 6). 
 84. Id. (manuscript ch. 7).  
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 87. Id. (manuscript ch. 5).  
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California accidentally demonstrated the variety of political, eco-
nomic, and legal levers that might lead to decreases in prison 
rates—the base of his very cautious ultimate recommendations 
about top-down policy change.90 
One, alas, is a bit of a throwaway. Acknowledging that the 
most powerful actors over sentencing outcomes are prosecutors, 
he imagines that changing the way they conceive their jobs 
would logically move the needle on decarceration.91 But, as elab-
orated in Professor John Pfaff ’s essay in this volume,92 Professor 
Zimring rather abruptly dismisses any hope for change along 
these lines.93 He presumably does so because he believes that the 
predispositions and attitudes of prosecutors are so substantially 
determined by their institutional powers that they will never 
have much incentive to act very differently unless forced to by 
higher authorities or a radical restructuring of where they sit in 
the system.  
But Professor Zimring places tentative bets on two other 
ideas—ideas that might indeed fundamentally change the way 
prosecutors act without any expectation of redeeming or chang-
ing their hearts and minds. 
The first is, in a sense, constitutional. Throughout the book, 
Professor Zimring emphasizes that the bottom line of sentencing 
outcomes in any jurisdiction results from compromises among—
and often uncoordinated overlapping decisions by—numerous 
agencies of government, with most taking on sentencing in indi-
vidual cases.94 Professor Zimring is confident that the big moves 
needed to reverse the boom require reallocating power upward 
to authorities that think of sentencing in deliberately macro-
level terms.95 This might suggest pushing power to the legisla-
ture or the top of the executive branch. But this reallocation can 
be at a somewhat lower level so long as those higher authorities 
allocate the powers of general sentencing policy to the right kind 
of entity. And for Professor Zimring, that entity can be a sentenc-
ing commission.96 Professor Zimring briefly sketches the types of 
commissions we have now, and the variety of powers that they 
 
 90. Id. (manuscript ch. 8 at 272). 
 91. Id. (manuscript ch. 8).  
 92. John F. Pfaff, Why the Policy Failures of Mass Incarceration Are Really 
Political Failures, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2673 (2020). 
 93. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 8).  
 94. Id. (manuscript ch. 4).  
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have.97 The good news is that Professor Zimring’s vision of the 
possible role of a sentencing commission accords with the kind 
of ambition (dare I say optimistic ambition?) for fundamental 
change that reversing mass incarceration will require. If a sen-
tencing commission can commit government to rational cost-ben-
efit analysis of sentencing, and constrain the bureaucratic 
tendencies of governmental actors and the demagoguery of elec-
toral politics, then it might be up to the task. Perhaps the bad, 
but tempering, news is that sentencing commissions have been 
around for quite a while, and despite advocates touting their 
promise,98 they have not been a major factor in national efforts 
to reduce imprisonment.99 Perhaps they could be, but to give 
them the leverage Professor Zimring desires, their promoters 
would have to overcome the great resistance they face from those 
(often prosecutors!) who raise constitutional objections to ceding 
to an administrative agency the power to constrain sentences 
handed out on the ground. A tough realist like Professor Zimring 
is hardly naïve about the hard political work needed to grant 
commissions the powers he would allocate to them. But quite un-
derstandably, his new expression of hope in commissions at the 
end of this book is hardly the occasion to write a manual for that 
work. 
The other big idea has to do with what Professor Zimring 
likes to call the “correctional free lunch.”100 As developed at great 
length and with great empirical grounding by Professor David 
Ball,101 the idea is that the local authorities who determine sen-
tences operate by imposing a huge negative externality on other 
parts of government—most obviously the state governments 
that pay for the prisons to which the locals send their convicted 
offenders.102 Professor Zimring underscores the value of using 
financial incentives and disincentives to internalize the costs of 
imprisonment with those who have the power to sentence.103 For 
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example, the county board of supervisors that must triage lim-
ited funds among the many competing demands from its agen-
cies and constituents will ensure that the local prosecutors are 
properly parsimonious in their charging decisions and sentenc-
ing recommendations.104 Again, this is a laudable idea, and if re-
formers could find a way of substantially curing government of 
all these perverse incentives and externalization problems, then 
reversing the prison boom would seem more imaginable. The op-
portunity for reformers is there; the programmatic blueprint has 
not been drafted yet. 
So there is more prose than poetry in these recommenda-
tions, but that does not surprise, nor should it disappoint. Just 
as Professor Zimring has disavowed any promise of empirical 
bottom lines, so does he implicitly disavow any passion-eliciting 
revolutionary programs to extricate ourselves from the predica-
ment we have trapped ourselves in with these decades of hyper-
incarceration. But he never discourages us from the hard and 
uncertain work of reconfiguring the structures of government 
that were at least complicit in, if perhaps not the cause of, the 
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